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Abstract4
What payoffs are positionally determined for deterministic two-player antagonistic games on finite5
directed graphs? In this paper we study this question for payoffs that are continuous. The main6
reason why continuous positionally determined payoffs are interesting is that they include the7
multi-discounted payoffs.8
We show that for continuous payoffs positional determinacy is equivalent to a simple property9
called prefix-monotonicity. We provide three proofs of it, using three major techniques of establishing10
positional determinacy – inductive technique, fixed point technique and strategy improvement11
technique. A combination of these approaches provides us with better understanding of the structure12
of continuous positionally determined payoffs as well as with some algorithmic results.13
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1 Introduction20
We study games of the following kind. A game takes place on a finite directed graph. There21
is a token, initially located in one of the nodes. Before each turn there is exactly one node22
containing the token. In each turn one of the two antagonistic players called Max and Min23
chooses an edge starting in a node containing the token. As a result the token moves to the24
endpoint of this edge, and then the next turn starts. To determine who makes a move in a25
turn we are given in advance a partition of the nodes into two sets. If the token is in a node26
from the first set, then Max makes a move, otherwise Min.27
Players make infinitely many moves, and this yields an infinite trajectory of the token.28
Technically, we assume that each node of the graph has at least one out-going edge so that29
there is always at least one available move. To introduce competitiveness, we should somehow30
compare the trajectories of the token with each other. For that we first fix some finite set A31
and label the edges of the game graph by elements of A. We also fix a payoff ϕ which is32
a function from the set of infinite sequences of elements of A to R. Each possible infinite33
trajectory of the token is then mapped to a real number called the reward of this trajectory34
as follows: we form an infinite sequence of elements of A by taking the labels of edges along35
the trajectory, and apply ϕ to this sequence. The larger the reward is the more Max is happy;36
on the contrary, Min wants to minimize the reward.37
For both of the players we are interested in indicating an optimal strategy, i.e., an optimal38
instruction of how to play in all possible developments of the games. To point out among all39
the strategies the optimal ones we first introduce a notion of a value of a strategy. The value40
of a Max’s strategy σ is the infimum of the payoff over all infinite trajectories, consistent41
with the strategy. The reward of a play against σ cannot be smaller than its value, but can42
be arbitrarily close to it. Now, a strategy of Max is called optimal if its value is maximal over43
all Max’s strategies. Similarly, the value of a Min’s strategy is the supremum of the payoff44
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over all infinite trajectories, consistent with this Min’s strategy. Min’s strategies minimizing45
the value are called optimal.46
Observe that the value of any Min’s strategy is at least as large as the value of any Max’s47
strategy. A pair (σ, τ) of a Max’s strategy σ and a Min’s strategy τ is called an equilibrium48
if the value of σ equals the value of τ . Both strategies appearing in an equilibrium must be49
optimal – one proves the optimality of the other. In this paper we only study the so-called50
determined payoffs – payoffs for which all games on finite directed graphs with this payoff51
have an equilibrium.52
For general determined payoffs an optimal strategy might be rather complicated (since53
the game is infinite, it might even have no finite description). For what determined payoffs54
both players always have a “simple” optimal strategy? A word “simple” can be understood55
in different ways [2], and this leads to different classes of determined payoffs. Among these56
classes we study one for which “simple” is understood in, perhaps, the strongest sense possible.57
Namely, we study a class of positionally determined payoffs.58
For a positionally determined payoff all game graphs must have a pair of positional59
strategies which is an equilibrium no matter in which node the game starts. Now, a positional60
strategy is a strategy which totally ignores the previous trajectory of the token1 and only61
looks at its current location. Formally, a positional strategy of Max maps each Max’s node62
to an edge which starts in this node (i.e., to a single edge which Max will use whenever this63
node contains the token). Min’s positional strategies are defined similarly.64
A lot of works are devoted to concrete positionally determined payoffs that are of particular65
interest in other areas of computer science. Classical examples of such payoffs are parity66
payoffs, mean payoffs and (multi-)discounted payoffs [5, 21, 20, 23]. Their applications range67
from logic, verification and finite automata theory [6, 12] to decision-making [22, 24] and68
algorithm design [3].69
Along with this specialized research, in [9, 10] Gimbert and Zielonka undertook a thorough70
study of positionally determined payoffs in general. In [9] they showed that all the so-called71
fairly mixing payoffs are positionally determined. They also demonstrated that virtually72
all classical positionally determined payoffs are fairly mixing. Next, in [10] they established73
a property of payoffs which is equivalent to positional determinacy. Despite being rather74
technical, this property has a remarkable feature: if a payoff does not satisfy it, then this75
payoff violates positional determinacy in some one-player game graph (where one of the76
players owns all the nodes). As Gimbert and Zielonka indicate, this means that to establish77
positional determinacy of a payoff it is enough to do so only for one-player game graphs.78
One could try to gain more understanding about positionally determined payoffs that79
satisfy certain additional requirements. Of course, this is interesting only if there are80
practically important positionally determined payoffs that satisfy these requirements. One81
such requirement studied in the literature is called prefix-independence [4, 8]. A payoff is82
prefix-independent if it is invariant under throwing away any finite prefix from an infinite83
sequence of edge labels. For instance, the parity and the mean payoffs are prefix-independent.84
In [9] Gimbert and Zielonka briefly mention another interesting additional requirement,85
namely, continuity. They observe that the multi-discounted payoffs are continuous (they86
utilize this in showing that the multi-discounted payoffs are fairly mixing). In this paper87
we study continuous positionally determined payoffs in more detail. Continuity of a payoff,88
loosely speaking, means that its range converges to just a single point as more and more89
1 In particular, a node in which the game has started.
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initial characters of an infinite sequence of edge labels are getting fixed. This contrasts with90
prefix-independent payoffs (such as the parity and the mean payoffs), for which any initial91
finite segment is irrelevant. Thus, continuity serves as a natural property which separates92
the multi-discounted payoffs from the other classical positionally determined payoffs. This is93
our main motivation to study continuous positionally determined payoffs in general, besides94
the general importance of the notion of continuity.95
We show that for continuous payoff positional determinacy is equivalent to a simple96
property which we call prefix-monotonicity. Loosely speaking, prefix-monotonicity means the97
result of a comparison of the payoff on two infinite sequences of labels does not change after98
appending or deleting the same finite prefix. In fact, we prove this result in three different99
ways, using three major techniques of establishing positional determinacy:100
An inductive argument. Here we use a sufficient condition of Gimbert and Zielonka [9],101
which is proved by induction on the number of edges of a game graph. This type of102
argument goes back to a paper of Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski [5], where they provide an103
inductive proof of the positional determinacy of the Mean Payoff Games.104
A fixed point argument. Then we give a proof which uses a fixed point approach due to105
Shapley [23]. Shapley’s technique is a standard way of establishing positional determinacy106
of Discounted Games. In this argument one derives positional determinacy from the107
existence of a solution to a certain system of equations (sometimes called Bellman’s108
equations). In turn, to establish the existence of a solution one uses Banach’s fixed point109
theorem.110
A strategy improvement argument. For Discounted Games the existence of a solution to111
Bellman’s equations can also be proved by strategy improvement. This technique goes112
back to Howard [16]; for its thorough treatment (as well as for its applications to other113
payoffs) we refer the reader to [7]. We generalize it to arbitrary continuous positionally114
determined payoffs.115
The simplest way to obtain our main result is via the inductive argument (at the cost of116
appealing without a proof to the results of Gimbert and Zielonka). We provide two other117
proofs for the following reasons.118
First, they have applications (and it is unclear how to get these applications within119
the framework of the inductive approach). The fixed point approach provides a precise120
understanding of what do continuous positionally determined payoffs look like in general. In121
the full version of this paper [19] we use this to answer a question of Gimbert [8] regarding122
positional determinacy in more general stochastic games. In turn, the strategy improvement123
approach has algorithmic consequences. More specifically, we show that a problem of finding124
a pair of optimal positional strategies is solvable in randomized subexponential time for any125
continuous positionally determined payoff.126
Second, as far as we know, these two approaches were never used in such an abstract127
setting before. Thus, we believe that our paper makes a useful addition to these approaches128
from a technical viewpoint. For example, the main problem for the fixed point approach is129
to identify a metric with which one can carry out the same “contracting argument” as in130
the case of multi-discounted payoffs. To solve it, we obtain a result of independent interest131
about compositions of continuous functions. As for the strategy improvement approach, our132
main contribution is a generalization of such well-established tools as “modified costs” and133
“potential transformation lemma” [15, Lemma 3.6].134
Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we formalize the concepts discussed in the135
introduction. Then in Sections 3–6 we expose our results in more detail. In Section 7136
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we indicate some possible future directions. Most of the proofs are omitted due to space137
constraints. In this version we provide only one of the three proofs of our main result138
completely (namely, one by the induction argument). Missing proofs can be found in the full139
version of this paper [19].140
2 Preliminaries141
We denote the function composition by ◦.142
Sets and sequences. For two sets A and B by AB we denote the set of all functions143
from B to A (sometime we will interpret AB as the set of vectors consisting of elements of A144
and with coordinates indexed by elements of B). We write C = A ⊔B for three sets A,B,C145
if A and B are disjoint and C = A ∪B.146
For a set A by A∗ we denote the set of all finite sequences of elements of A and by Aω147
we denote the set of all infinite sequences of elements of A. For w ∈ A∗ we let |w| be the148
length of w. For α ∈ Aω we let |α| = ∞.149
For u ∈ A∗ and v ∈ A∗ ∪ Aω we let uv denote the concatenation of u and v. We call150
u ∈ A∗ a prefix of v ∈ A∗ ∪ Aω if for some w ∈ A∗ ∪ Aω we have v = uw. For w ∈ A∗ by151
wAω we denote the set {wα | α ∈ Aω}. Alternatively, wAω is the set of all β ∈ Aω such that152
w is a prefix of β.153
For u ∈ A∗ and k ∈ N we use a notation154
uk = uu . . . u︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
.155
In turn, we let uω ∈ Aω be a unique element of Aω such that uk is a prefix of uω for every156
k ∈ N. We call α ∈ Aω ultimately periodic if α is a concatenation of u and vω for some157
u, v ∈ A∗.158
Graphs notation. By a finite directed graph G we mean a pair G = (V,E) of two finite159
sets V and E equipped with two functions source, target : E → V . Elements of V are called160
nodes of G and elements of E are called edges of G. For an edge e ∈ E we understand161
source(e) (respectively, target(e)) as the node in which e starts (respectively, ends). We allow162
parallel edges; i.e., there might be two distinct edges e, e′ ∈ E with source(e) = source(e′),163
target(e) = target(e′). We allow self-loops as well (i.e., edges with source(e) = target(e)).164
The out-degree of a node a ∈ V is |{e ∈ E | source(e) = a}|. A node a ∈ V is called a165
sink if its out-degree is 0. We call a graph G sinkless if there are no sinks in G.166
A path in G is a non-empty (finite or infinite) sequence of edges of G with a property167
that target(e) = source(e′) for any two consecutive edges e and e′ from the sequence. For a168
path p we define source(p) = source(e), where e is the first edge of p. For a finite path p we169
define target(p) = target(e′), where e′ is the last edge of p.170
For technical convenience we also consider 0-length paths. Each 0-length path is associated171
with some node of G (so that there are |V | different 0-length paths). For a 0-length path p,172
associated with a ∈ V , we define source(p) = target(p) = a.173
When we write pq for two paths p and q we mean the concatenation of p and q (viewed174
as sequences of edges). Of course, this is well-defined only if p is finite. Note that pq is not175
necessarily a path. Namely, pq is a path if and only if target(p) = source(q).176
2.1 Deterministic infinite duration games on finite directed graphs177
Mechanics of the game. By a game graph we mean a sinkless finite directed graph178
G = ⟨V,E, source, target⟩, equipped with two sets VMax and VMin such that V = VMax ⊔VMin.179
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A game graph G = ⟨V = VMax ⊔ VMin, E, source, target⟩ induces a so-called infinite180
duration game (IDG for short) on G. The game is always between two players called Max181
and Min. Positions of the game are finite paths in G (informally, these are possible finite182
trajectories of the token). We call a finite path p a Max’s (a Min’s) position if target(p) ∈ VMax183
(if target(p) ∈ VMin). Max makes moves in Max’s positions and Min makes moves in Min’s184
positions. We do not indicate any position as the starting one – it can be any node of G.185
The set of moves available at a position p is the set {e ∈ E | source(e) = target(p)}. A186
move e from a position p leads to a position pe.187
A Max’s strategy σ in a game graph G is a mapping assigning to every Max’s position p a188
move available at p. Similarly, a Min’s strategy τ in a game graph G is a mapping assigning189
to every Min’s position p a move available at p.190
Let P = e1e2e3 . . . be an infinite path in G. We say that P is consistent with a Max’s191
strategy σ if the following conditions hold:192
if s = source(P) ∈ VMax, then σ(s) = e1;193
for every i ≥ 1 it holds that target(e1e2 . . . ei) ∈ VMax =⇒ ei+1 = σ(e1e2 . . . ei).194
For a ∈ V and for a Max’s strategy σ we let Cons(a, σ) be a set of all infinite paths in G that195
start in a and are consistent with σ. We use similar terminology and notation for strategies196
of Min.197
Given a Max’s strategy σ, a Min’s strategy τ and a ∈ V , we let the play of σ and τ from198
a be a unique element of the intersection Cons(a, σ) ∩ Cons(a, τ). The play of σ and τ from199
a is denoted by Pσ,τa .200
Positional strategies. A Max’s strategy σ in a game graph G = ⟨V = VMax ⊔201
VMin, E, source, target⟩ is called positional if σ(p) = σ(q) for all finite paths p and q in G202
with target(p) = target(q) ∈ VMax. Clearly, a Max’s positional strategy σ can be represented203
as a mapping σ : VMax → E satisfying source(σ(u)) = u for all u ∈ VMax. We define Min’s204
positional strategies analogously.205
We call an edge e ∈ E consistent with a Max’s positional strategy σ if either source(e) ∈206
VMin or source(e) ∈ VMax, e = σ(source(e)). We denote the set of edges that are consistent207
with σ by Eσ. If τ is a Min’s positional strategy, then we say that an edge e ∈ E is consistent208
with τ if either source(e) ∈ VMax or source(e) ∈ VMin, e = τ(source(e)). The set of edges that209
are consistent with a Min’s positional strategy τ is denoted by Eτ .210
Labels and payoffs. Let A be a finite set. A game graph G = ⟨, V = VMax ⊔211
VMin, E, source, target⟩ equipped with a function lab : E → A is called an A-labeled game212
graph. If p = e1e2e3 . . . is a (finite or infinite) path in an A-labeled game graph G = ⟨V =213
VMax ⊔ VMin, E, source, target, lab⟩, we define lab(p) = lab(e1)lab(e2)lab(e3) . . . ∈ A∗ ∪Aω. A214
payoff is a bounded function from Aω to R. Some papers allow A to be infinite and consider215
only infinite sequences that contain finitely many elements of A (as any game graph contains216
only finitely many labels). So basically we just have to deal with finite subsets of A, and this217
can be done with our approach.218
Values, optimal strategies and equilibria. Let A be a finite set, ϕ : Aω → R be a219
payoff and G = ⟨V = VMax ⊔ VMin, E, source, target, lab⟩ be an A-labeled game graph. Take220
a Max’s strategy σ in G. The value of σ in a node a ∈ V is the following quantity:221
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Similarly, if τ is a Min’s strategy in G, then the value of τ in a node a ∈ V is the following223
quantity:224





A Max’s strategy σ is called optimal if Val[σ](a) ≥ Val[σ′](a) for any a ∈ V and for any226
Max’s strategy σ′. Similarly, A Min’s strategy τ is called optimal if Val[τ ](a) ≤ Val[τ ′](a) for227
any a ∈ V and for any Min’s strategy τ ′.228
Observe that for any Max’s strategy σ, for any Min’s strategy τ and for any a ∈ V we229
have:230





In particular, this inequality gives us the following. If a pair (σ, τ) of a Max’s strategy σ232
and a Min’s strategy τ is such that Val[σ](a) = Val[τ ](a) for every a ∈ V , then both σ and233
τ are optimal for their players. We call any pair (σ, τ) with Val[σ](a) = Val[τ ](a) for every234
a ∈ V an equilibrium2. In fact, if at least one equilibrium exists, then the following holds:235
the Cartesian product of the set of the optimal strategies of Max and the set of the optimal236
strategies of Min is exactly the set of equilibria. We say that ϕ is determined if in every237
A-labeled game graph there exists an equilibrium (with respect to ϕ).238
Positionally determined payoffs. Let A be a finite set and ϕ : Aω → R be a payoff.239
We call ϕ positionally determined if all A-labeled game graphs have (with respect to ϕ) an240
equilibrium consisting of two positional strategies.241
I Proposition 1. If A is a finite set, ϕ : Aω → R is a positionally determined payoff and242
g : ϕ(Aω) → R is a non-decreasing3 function, then g ◦ ϕ is a positionally determined payoff.243
2.2 Continuous payoffs244
For a finite set A, we consider the set Aω as a topological space. Namely, we take the discrete245
topology on A and the corresponding product topology on Aω. In this product topology246





where S ⊆ A∗. When we say that a payoff ϕ : Aω → R is continuous we always mean249
continuity with respect to this product topology (and with respect to the standard topology250
on R). The following proposition gives a convenient way to establish continuity of payoffs.251
I Proposition 2. Let A be a finite set. A payoff ϕ : Aω → R is continuous if and only if for252
any α ∈ Aω and for any infinite sequence {βn}∞n=1 of elements of Aω the following holds. If253




For a finite A by Tychonoff’s theorem the space Aω is compact (because any finite set256
A with the discrete topology is compact). This has the following consequence which is257
important for this paper: if ϕ : Aω → R is a continuous payoff, then ϕ(Aω) is a compact258
subset of R.259
2 This definition is equivalent to a more standard one: (σ, τ) is an equilibrium if and only if σ is a “best
response” to τ in every node, and vice versa.
3 Throughout the paper we call a function f : S → R, S ⊆ R non-decreasing if for all x, y ∈ S with x ≤ y
we have f(x) ≤ f(y).
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3 Statement of the Main Result and Preliminary Discussion260
Our main result establishes a simple property which is equivalent to positional determinacy261
for continuous payoffs.262
I Definition 3. Let A be a finite set. A payoff ϕ : Aω → R is called prefix-monotone if263
there are no u, v ∈ A∗, β, γ ∈ Aω such that ϕ(uβ) > ϕ(uγ) and ϕ(vβ) < ϕ(vγ).264
(One can note that prefix-independence trivially implies prefix-monotonicity. On the265
other hand, no prefix-independent payoff which takes at least 2 values is continuous.)266
I Theorem 4. Let A be a finite set and ϕ : Aω → R be a continuous payoff. Then ϕ is267
positionally determined if and only if ϕ is prefix-monotone.268
The fact that any continuous positionally determined payoff must be prefix-monotone4 is269
proved in Appendix A. Three different proofs of the “if” part of Theorem 4 are discussed in,270
respectively, Sections 4, 5 and 6. Before going into the proofs, let us discuss the notions of271
continuity and prefix-monotonicity by means of the multi-discounted payoffs.272
I Definition 5. A payoff ϕ : Aω → R for a finite set A is multi-discounted if there are273
functions λ : A → [0, 1) and w : A → R such that274
ϕ(a1a2a3 . . .) =
∞∑
n=1
λ(a1) · . . . · λ(an−1) · w(an) (1)275
for all a1a2a3 . . . ∈ Aω.276
A few technical remarks: since the set A is finite, the coefficients λ(a) are bounded away277
from 1 uniformly over a ∈ A. This ensures that the series (1) converges. In fact, this278
means that a tail of this series converges to 0 uniformly over a1a2a3 . . . ∈ Aω. Thus, the279
multi-discounted payoffs are continuous. As the multi-discounted payoffs are positionally280
determined, by Theorem 4 they also must be prefix-monotone. Of course, prefix-monotonicity281
of the multi-discounted payoffs can be established without Theorem 4. Indeed, from (1) it is282
easy to derive that ϕ(aβ) − ϕ(aγ) = λ(a) · (ϕ(β) − ϕ(γ)) for all a ∈ A, β, γ ∈ Aω. Due to283
the condition λ(a) ≥ 0, we have that ϕ(aβ) > ϕ(aγ) implies that ϕ(β) > ϕ(γ). Moreover,284
the same holds if we append more than one character to β and γ. Hence it is impossible285
to simultaneously have ϕ(uβ) > ϕ(uγ) and ϕ(vβ) < ϕ(vγ) for u, v ∈ A∗, as required in the286
definition of prefix-monotonicity.287
4 Inductive Argument288
Here we show that any continuous prefix-monotone payoff is positionally determined using a289
sufficient condition of Gimbert and Zielonka [9, Theorem 1], which, in turn, is proved by290
an inductive argument. As Gimbert and Zielonka indicate [9, Lemma 2], their sufficient291
condition takes the following form for continuous payoffs5.292
4 Here it is crucial that in our definition of positional determinacy we require that some positional strategy
is optimal for all the nodes. Allowing each starting node to have its own optimal positional strategy
gives us a weaker, “non-uniform” version of positional determinacy. It is not clear whether non-uniform
positional determinacy implies prefix-monotonicity. At the same time, we are not even aware of a payoff
which is positional only “non-uniformly”.
5 Lemma 2 can only be found in the HAL version of their paper.
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I Proposition 6. Let A be a finite set. Any continuous payoff ϕ : Aω → R, satisfying the293
following two conditions:294
(a) for all u ∈ A∗ and α, β ∈ Aω we have that ϕ(α) ≤ ϕ(β) =⇒ ϕ(uα) ≤ ϕ(uβ);295
(b) for all non-empty u ∈ A∗ and for all α ∈ Aω we have that296
min{ϕ(uω), ϕ(α)} ≤ ϕ(uα) ≤ max{ϕ(uω), ϕ(α)};297
is positionally determined.298
We observe that one can get rid of the condition (b) in this Proposition.299
I Proposition 7. For continuous payoffs the condition (a) of Proposition 6 implies the300
condition (b) of Proposition 6.301
Proof. See Appendix B. J302
So to establish positional determinacy of a continuous payoff it is enough to demonstrate303
that this payoff satisfies the condition (a) of Proposition 6. Let us now reformulate this304
condition using the following definition.305
I Definition 8. Let A be a finite set. A payoff ϕ : Aω → R is called shift-deterministic if306
for all a ∈ A, β, γ ∈ Aω we have ϕ(β) = ϕ(γ) =⇒ ϕ(aβ) = ϕ(aγ).307
I Observation 9. Let A be a finite set. A payoff ϕ : Aω → R satisfies the condition (a) of308
Proposition 6 if and only if ϕ is prefix-monotone and shift-deterministic.309
The above discussion gives the following sufficient condition for positional determinacy.310
I Proposition 10. Let A be a finite set. Any continuous prefix-monotone shift-deterministic311
payoff ϕ : Aω → R is positionally determined.312
Still, some argument is needed for continuous prefix-monotone payoffs that are not313
shift-deterministic. To tie up loose ends we prove the following:314
I Proposition 11. Let A be a finite set and let ϕ : Aω → R be a continuous prefix-monotone315
payoff. Then ϕ = g ◦ ψ for some continuous prefix-monotone shift-deterministic payoff316
ψ : Aω → R and for some continuous6 non-decreasing function g : ψ(Aω) → R.317
Proof. See Appendix C. J318
Due to Proposition 1 this finishes our first proof of Theorem 4. In fact, we do not need319
continuity of g here, but it will be useful later.320
5 Fixed point argument321
Here we present a way of establishing positional determinacy of continuous prefix-monotone322
shift-deterministic payoffs (Proposition 10) via a fixed point argument. Together with323
Proposition 11 this constitutes our second proof of Theorem 4.324
Obviously, for any shift-deterministic payoff ϕ : Aω → R and for any a ∈ A there is325




= ϕ(aβ) for all326
β ∈ Aω.327
6 Throughout the paper we call a function f : S → R, S ⊆ Rn continuous if f is continuous with respect
to a restriction of the standard topology of Rn to S.
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I Observation 12. A shift-deterministic payoff ϕ : Aω → R is prefix-monotone if and only328
if shift[a, ϕ] is non-decreasing for every a ∈ A.329
We use this notation to introduce the so-called Bellman’s equations, playing a key role in330
our fixed point argument.331
I Definition 13. Let A be a finite set, ϕ : Aω → R be a shift-deterministic payoff and332
G = ⟨V = VMax ⊔ VMin, E, source, target, lab⟩ be an A-labeled game graph.333














, for u ∈ VMin. (3)336
337
The most important step of our argument is to show the existence of a solution to338
Bellman’s equations.339
I Proposition 14. For any finite set A, for any continuous prefix-monotone shift-deterministic340
payoff ϕ : Aω → R and for any A-labeled game graph G there exists a solution to Bellman’s341
equations for ϕ in G.342
(One can also show the uniqueness of a solution, but we do not need this for the argument).343
This proposition requires some additional work, and we first discuss how to derive344
positional determinacy of continuous prefix-monotone shift-deterministic payoffs from it.345
Assume that we are give a solution x to (2–3). How can one extract an equilibrium of346
positional strategies from it? For that we take any pair of positional strategies that use347
only x-tight edges. Now, an edge e is x-tight if xsource(e) = shift[a, ϕ](xtarget(e)). Note348
that each node must contain an out-going x-tight edge (this will be any edge on which349
the maximum/minimum in (2–3) is attained for this node). So clearly each player has at350
least one positional strategy which only uses x-tight edges. It remains to show that for351
continuous prefix-monotone shift-deterministic ϕ any two such strategies of the players form352
an equilibrium.353
I Lemma 15. If A is a finite set, ϕ : Aω → R is a continuous prefix-monotone shift-354
deterministic payoff, and x ∈ ϕ(Aω)V is a solution to (2–3) for an A-labeled game graph355
G = ⟨V = VMax ⊔ VMin, E, source, target, lab⟩, then the following holds. Let σ∗ be a positional356
strategy of Max and τ∗ be a positional strategy of Min such that σ∗(VMax) and τ∗(VMin)357
consist only of x-tight edges. Then (σ∗, τ∗) is an equilibrium in G.358
We now proceed to details of our proof of Proposition 14. Consider a function T : ϕ(Aω)V →359
ϕ(Aω)V , mapping x ∈ ϕ(Aω)V to the vector of the right-hand sides of (2–3). We should360
argue that T has a fixed point. For that we will construct a continuous metric D : ϕ(Aω)V ×361
ϕ(Aω)V → [0,+∞) with respect to which T is contracting. More precisely, D(Tx, Ty) will362
always be smaller than D(x,y) as long as x and y are distinct. Due to the compactness of363
the domain of T this will prove that T has a fixed point.364
Now, to construct such D we show that for continuous shift-deterministic ϕ there365
must be a continuous metric d : ϕ(Aω) × ϕ(Aω) → [0,+∞) such that for all a ∈ A the366
function shift[a, ϕ] is d-contracting. Once we have such d, we let D(x,y) be the maximum of367
d(xa,ya) over a ∈ V . Checking that T is contracting with respect to such D will be rather368
straightforward (technically, we will need an additional property of d which can be derived369
from the prefix-monotonicity of ϕ).370
The main technical challenge is to prove the existence of d. In the full version of this371
paper we do so via the following general fact about compositions of continuous functions.372
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I Theorem 16. Let K ⊆ R be a compact set, m ≥ 1 be a natural number and f1, . . . , fm : K →373
K be m continuous functions. Then the following two conditions are equivalent:374
(a) for any a1a2a3 . . . ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}ω we have limn→∞ diam
(
fa1 ◦fa2 ◦ . . .◦fan(K)
)
= 0375
(by diam(S) for S ⊆ R we mean supx,y∈S |x− y|);376
(b) there exists a continuous metric d : K × K → [0,+∞) such that f1, f2, . . . , fm are377
all d-contracting (a function h : K → K is called d-contracting if for all x, y ∈ K with378
x ̸= y we have d(h(x), h(y)) < d(x, y)).379
If f1, . . . , fm are non-decreasing, then one can strengthen item (b) by demanding that380
d satisfies the following property: for all x, y, s, t ∈ K with x ≤ s ≤ t ≤ y we have381
d(s, t) ≤ d(x, y).382
Namely, we apply this theorem to the functions shift[a, ϕ] for a ∈ A (for that we first383
show that the continuity of ϕ implies that these functions satisfy item (a) of Theorem 16).384
5.1 Applications of the fixed point technique385
Theorem 16 additionally provides an exhaustive method of generating continuous positionally386
determined payoffs.387
I Theorem 17. Let m be a natural number. The set of continuous positionally determined388
payoffs from7 {1, 2, . . . ,m}ω to R coincides with the set of ϕ that can be obtained in the389
following 5 steps.390
Step 1. Take a compact set K ⊆ R.391
Step 2. Take a continuous metric d : K ×K → [0,+∞).392
Step 3. Take m non-decreasing d-contracting functions f1, f2, . . . , fm : K → K (they393
will automatically be continuous due to continuity of d).394
Step 4. Define ψ : {1, . . . ,m}ω → K so that395
{ψ(a1a2a3 . . .)} =
∞⋂
n=1
fa1 ◦ fa2 ◦ . . . ◦ fan(K)396
for every 8 a1a2a3 . . . ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}ω.397
Step 5. Choose a continuous non-decreasing function g : ψ({1, 2, . . . ,m}ω) → R and set398
ϕ = g ◦ ψ.399
I Remark 18. Recall that we did not use continuity of g from Proposition 11 in the inductive400
argument. It becomes important for Theorem 17 – otherwise we could not argue that all401
continuous positionally payoffs can be obtained in these 5 steps.402
We get the multi-discounted payoffs when the functions f1, f2, . . . , fm are affine, each403
with the slope from [0, 1). In this case they will be contracting with respect to a standard404
metric d(x, y) = |x − y|. We get the whole set of continuous positionally determined405
payoffs by relaxing the multi-discounted payoffs in the following three regards: (a) functions406
f1, f2, . . . , fm do not have to be affine; (b) d can be an arbitrary continuous metric; (c) any407
continuous non-decreasing function g can be applied to a payoff.408
We use Theorem 17 to construct a continuous positionally determined payoff which does409
not “reduce” to the multi-discounted ones, in a sense of the following definition.410
7 Of course, in this theorem a set of labels can be any finite set, we let it be {1, 2, . . . , m} for some m ∈ N
just to simplify the notation.
8 Note that this intersection always consists of a single point due to Cantor’s intersection theorem and
item (a) of Theorem 16. This will also be limn→∞ fa1 ◦ fa2 ◦ . . . ◦ fan (x) for any x ∈ K.
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I Definition 19. Let A be a finite set, ϕ,ψ : Aω → R be two payoffs, and G be an A-labeled411
game graph. We say that ϕ positionally reduces to ψ inside G if any pair of positional412
strategies in G which is an equilibrium for ψ is also an equilibrium for ϕ.413
This definition has an algorithmic motivation. Namely, note that finding a positional414
equilibrium for ψ in G is at least as hard as for ϕ, provided that ϕ reduces to ψ inside415
G. There are classical reductions from Parity to Mean Payoff games [17] and from Mean416
Payoff to Discounted games [25] that work in exactly this way. See also [11] for a reduction417
from Priority Mean Payoff games to Multi-Discounted games. As far as we know, our next418
proposition provides the first example of a positionally determined payoff which does not419
reduce to the multi-discounted ones in this sense.420
I Proposition 20. There exist a finite set A, a continuous positionally determined payoff421
ϕ : Aω → R and an A-labeled game graph G such that there exists no multi-discounted payoff422
to which ϕ reduces inside G.423
Proposition 20 means, in particular, that there exists a continuous positionally determined424
payoff which differs from all the multi-discounted ones (as was stated in Section 3). This fact425
alone can be used to disprove a conjecture of Gimbert [8]. Namely, Gimbert conjectured the426
following: “Any payoff function which is positional for the class of non-stochastic one-player427
games is positional for the class of Markov decision processes”. To show that this is not the428
case, in the full version of this paper [19] we establish that all continuous payoffs that are429
positionally determined in Markov decision processes are multi-discounted.430
6 Strategy improvement argument431
Here we establish the existence of a solution to Bellman’s equations (Proposition 14) via432
the strategy improvement. This will yield our third proof of Theorem 4. We start with an433
observation that a vector of values of a positional strategy always gives a solution9 to a434
restriction of Bellman’s equations to edges that are consistent with this strategy.435
I Lemma 21. Let A be a finite set, ϕ : Aω → R be a continuous prefix-monotone shift-436
deterministic payoff and G = ⟨V = VMax ⊔ VMin, E, source, target, lab⟩ be an A-labeled game437
graph. Then for every positional strategy σ of Max in G we have:438













for u ∈ VMin.440
441
Next, take a positional strategy σ of Max. If the vector {Val[σ](u)}u∈V happens to442
be a solution to the Bellman’s equations, then we are done. Otherwise by Lemma 21443





. We call edges satisfying this property σ-violating. We show445
that switching σ to any σ-violating edge gives us a positional strategy which improves σ.446
9 Bellman’s equations involve the functions shift[a, ϕ] for a ∈ A, and these functions are defined on ϕ(Aω).
So formally we should argue that the values of any strategy belong to ϕ(Aω). Indeed, for continuous
ϕ the set ϕ(Aω) is compact and hence is closed, and all values are the infimums/supremums of some
subsets of ϕ(Aω).
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I Lemma 22. Let A be a finite set, ϕ : Aω → R be a continuous prefix-monotone shift-447
deterministic payoff and G = ⟨V = VMax ⊔ VMin, E, source, target, lab⟩ be an A-labeled game448
graph. Next, let σ be a positional strategy of Max in G. Assume that the vector Val[σ] =449
{Val[σ](u)}u∈V does not satisfy (2–3) and let e′ ∈ E be any σ-violating edge. Define a450
positional strategy σ′ of Max as follows:451
σ′(u) =
{










By this lemma, a Max’s positional strategy σ∗ maximizing the quantity
∑
u∈V Val[σ](u) (over454
positional strategies σ of Max) gives a solution to (2–3). Such σ∗ exists just because there are455
only finitely many positional strategies of Max. This finishes our strategy improvement proof456
of Proposition 14. Let us note that the same argument can be carried out with positional457
strategies of Min (via analogues of Lemma 21 and Lemma 22 for Min).458
6.1 Applications of the strategy improvement technique459
In this subsection we discuss implications of our strategy improvement argument to the460
strategy synthesis problem. Strategy synthesis for a positionally determined payoff ϕ is an461
algorithmic problem of finding an equilibrium (with respect to ϕ) of two positional strategies462
for a given game graph. It is classical that strategy synthesis for classical positionally463
determined payoffs admits a randomized algorithm which is subexponential in the number464
of nodes [14, 1]. We obtain the same subexponential bound for all continuous positionally465
determined payoffs. From a technical viewpoint, we just observe that a technique which466
was used for classical positionally determined payoffs is applicable in a more general setting.467
Specifically, we use a framework of recursively local-global functions due to Björklund and468
Vorobyov [1].469
Let us start with an observation that for continuous positionally determined shift-470
deterministic payoffs a non-optimal positional strategy can always be improved by changing471
it just in a single node.472
I Proposition 23. Let A be a finite set and ϕ : Aω → R be a continuous positionally473
determined shift-deterministic payoff. Then for any A-labeled game graph G = ⟨V =474
VMax ⊔ VMin, E, source, target, lab⟩ the following two conditions hold:475
if σ is a non-optimal positional strategy of Max in G, then in G there exists a Max’s476
positional strategy σ′ such that |{u ∈ VMax | σ(u) ̸= σ′(u)}| = 1 and
∑
u∈V Val[σ′](u) >477 ∑
u∈V Val[σ](u);478
if τ is a non-optimal positional strategy of Min in G, then in G there exists a Min’s479
positional strategy τ ′ such that |{u ∈ VMin | τ(u) ̸= τ ′(u)}| = 1 and
∑
u∈V Val[τ ′](u) <480 ∑
u∈V Val[τ ](u).481
It is instructive to visualize this proposition by imagining the set of positional strategies482
of one of the players (say, Max) as a hypercube. Namely, in this hypercube there will be as483
many dimensions as there are nodes of Max. A coordinate corresponding to a node u ∈ VMax484
will take values in the set of edges that start at u. Obviously, vertices of such hypercube are485
in a one-to-one correspondence with positional strategies of Max. Let us call two vertices486
neighbors of each other if they differ in exactly one coordinate. Now, Proposition 23 means487
in this language the following: any vertex σ, maximizing
∑
u∈V Val[σ](u) over its neighbors,488
also maximizes this quantity over the whole hypercube.489
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So an optimization problem of maximizing
∑
u∈V Val[σ](u) (equivalently, finding an490
optimal positional strategy of Max) has the following remarkable feature: all its local maxima491
are also global. For positional strategies of Min the same holds for the minima. Optimization492
problems with this feature are in a focus of numerous works, starting from a classical area of493
convex optimization.494
Observe that in our case this local-global property is recursive; i.e., it holds for any495
restriction to a subcube of our hypercube. Indeed, subcubes correspond to subgraphs of496
our initial game graph, and for any subgraph we still have Proposition 23. Björklund and497
Vorobyov [1] noticed that a similar phenomenon occurs for all classical positionally determined498
payoffs. In turn, they showed that any optimization problem on a hypercube with this499
recursive local-global property admits a randomized algorithm which is subexponential in the500
dimension of a hypercube. In our case this yields a randomized algorithm for the strategy501
synthesis problem which is subexponential in the number of nodes of a game graph.502
Still, this only applies to continuous payoffs that are shift-deterministic (as we have503
Proposition 23 only for shift-deterministic payoffs). One more issue is that we did not specify504
how our payoffs are represented. We overcome these difficulties in the following result.505
I Theorem 24. Let A be a finite set and ϕ : Aω → R be a continuous positionally determined506
payoff. Consider an oracle which for given u, v, a, b ∈ A∗ tells, whether there exists w ∈ A∗507
such that ϕ(wu(v)ω) > ϕ(wa(b)ω). There exists a randomized algorithm which with this508







game graphs with n nodes and m edges. In particular, every call to the oracle in the510








So to deal with the issue of representation we assume a suitable oracle access to ϕ. Still,513
the oracle from Theorem 24 might look unmotivated. Here it is instructive to recall that514
all continuous positionally determined ϕ must be prefix-monotone. For prefix-monotone515
ϕ a formula ∃w ∈ A∗ ϕ(wα) > ϕ(wβ) defines a total preorder on Aω, and our oracle516
just compares ultimately periodic sequences according to this preorder. In fact, it is easy517
to see that the formula ∃w ∈ A∗ ϕ(wα) > ϕ(wβ) defines a total preorder on Aω if and518
only if ϕ is prefix-monotone. This indicates a fundamental role of this preorder for prefix-519
monotone ϕ and justifies a use of the corresponding oracle in Theorem 24. Let us note that520 [
∃w ∈ A∗ ϕ(wα) > ϕ(wβ)
]
⇐⇒ ϕ(α) > ϕ(β) if ϕ is additionally shift-deterministic.521
7 Discussion522
As Gimbert and Zielonka show by their characterization of the class of positionally determined523
payoffs [10], positional determinacy can always be proved by an inductive argument. Does524
the same hold for two other techniques that we have considered in the paper – the fixed525
point technique and the strategy improvement technique? The answer is positive in the526
continuous case, so this suggests that the answer might also be positive at least in some527
other special cases, for instance, for prefix-independent payoffs. E.g., for the mean payoff,528
a major example of a prefix-independent positionally determined payoff, both the strategy529
improvement and the fixed point arguments are applicable [13, 18].530
These questions are specifically interesting for the strategy improvement argument. Indeed,531
strategy improvement usually leads to subexponential-time (randomized) algorithms for the532
strategy synthesis. So this resonates with a question of how hard strategy synthesis for a533
positionally determined payoff can be. Loosely speaking, do we have this subexponential534
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bound for all positionally determined payoffs (as we do, by Theorem 24, for all such payoffs535
that are additionally continuous)?536
Finally, is it possible to characterize positionally determined payoffs more explicitly (say,537
as in Theorem 17)? This question sounds more approachable in special cases, and a natural538
special case to start is again the prefix-independent case.539
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A The “Only If” Part of Theorem 4597
Assume that ϕ is not prefix-monotone. Then for some u, v ∈ A∗ and α, β ∈ Aω we have598
ϕ(uα) > ϕ(uβ) and ϕ(vα) < ϕ(vβ). (4)599
First, notice that by continuity of ϕ we may assume that α and β are ultimately periodic.600
Indeed, consider any two sequences {αn}n∈N and {βn}n∈N of ultimately periodic sequences601
from Aω such that αn and α (respectively, βn and β) have the same prefix of length n. Then602
from continuity of ϕ (by Proposition 2) we have:603
lim
n→∞






ϕ(uβn) = ϕ(uβ), lim
n→∞
ϕ(vβn) = ϕ(vβ).606
So if u, v, α, β violate prefix-monotonicity, then so do u, v, αn, βn for some n ∈ N.607
Now, if α, β are ultimately periodic, then α = p(q)ω and β = w(r)ω for some p, q, w, r ∈ A∗.608











Figure 1 A game graph where ϕ is not positionally determined.
609
In this game graph there are two positional strategies of Max, one which from c goes by610
p and the other which goes from c by w. The first one is not optimal when the game starts611
in b, and the second one is not optimal when the game starts in a (because of (4)). So ϕ is612
not positionally determined in this game graph.613
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B Proof of Proposition 7614
We only show that ϕ(uα) ≤ max{ϕ(uω), ϕ(α)}, the other inequality can be proved similarly.615
If ϕ(uα) ≤ ϕ(α), then we are done. Assume now that ϕ(uα) > ϕ(α). By repeatedly applying616
(a) we obtain ϕ(ui+1α) ≥ ϕ(uiα) for every i ∈ N. In particular, for every i ≥ 1 we get that617
ϕ(uiα) ≥ ϕ(uα). By continuity of ϕ the limit of ϕ(uiα) as i → ∞ exists and equals ϕ(uω).618
Hence ϕ(uω) ≥ ϕ(uα).619
C Proof of Proposition 11620








ϕ(wγ), γ ∈ Aω. (5)622
First, why is ψ well-defined, i.e., why does this series converge? Since Aω is compact, so is623
ϕ(Aω) ⊆ R, because ϕ is continuous. Hence ϕ(Aω) ⊆ [−W,W ] for some W > 0 and (5) is624








We shall show that ψ is continuous, prefix-monotone and shift-deterministic, and that627
ϕ = g ◦ ψ for some continuous non-decreasing g : ψ(Aω) → R.628
Why is ψ continuous? Consider any α ∈ Aω and any infinite sequence {βn}n∈N of629
elements of Aω such that for all n the sequences α and βn coincide in the first n elements.630
















The first series, as we have seen, is bounded uniformly (in n) by an absolutely converging633
series. So it remains to note that the first series converges to the second one term-wise, by634
continuity of ϕ.635
Why is ψ prefix-monotone? Let α, β ∈ Aω. We have to show that either ψ(uα) ≥636
ψ(uβ) for all u ∈ A∗ or ψ(uα) ≤ ψ(uβ) for all u ∈ A∗.637
Since ϕ is prefix-monotone, then either ϕ(wα) ≥ ϕ(wβ) for all w ∈ A∗ or ϕ(wα) ≤ ϕ(wβ)638
for all w ∈ A∗. Up to swapping α and β we may assume that ϕ(wα) ≥ ϕ(wβ) for all w ∈ A∗.639
Then for any u ∈ A∗ the difference640










consists of non-negative terms. Hence ψ(uα) ≥ ψ(uβ) for all u ∈ A∗, as required.642
Why is ψ shift-deterministic? Take any a ∈ A and β, γ ∈ Aω with ψ(β) = ψ(γ). We643
have to show that ψ(aβ) = ψ(aγ). Indeed, assume that644











If this series contains a non-zero term, then it must contain a positive term and a negative646
term. But this contradicts prefix-monotonicity of ϕ. So all the terms in this series must be 0.647
The same then must hold for a series:648










(all the terms in this series also appear in the series for ψ(β) − ψ(γ)). So we must have650
ψ(aβ) = ψ(aγ).651
Why ϕ = g ◦ ψ for some continuous non-decreasing g : ψ(Aω) → R? Let us first652
show that653
ϕ(α) > ϕ(β) =⇒ ψ(α) > ψ(β) for all α, β ∈ Aω. (6)654
Indeed, if ϕ(α) > ϕ(β), then we also have ϕ(wα) ≥ ϕ(wβ) for every w ∈ A∗, by prefix-655
monotonicity of ϕ. Now, by definition,656










All the terms in this series are non-negative, and the term corresponding to the empty w is658
strictly positive. So we have ψ(α) > ψ(β), as required.659
Now, let us demonstrate that (6) implies that ϕ = g ◦ ψ for some non-decreasing660
g : ψ(Aω) → R. Namely, define g as follows. For x ∈ ψ(Aω) take an arbitrary γ ∈ ψ−1(x)661
and set g(x) = ϕ(γ). First, why do we have ϕ = g ◦ ψ? By definition, g(ψ(α)) = ϕ(γ) for662
some γ ∈ Aω with ψ(α) = ψ(γ). By (6) we also have ϕ(α) = ϕ(γ), so g(ψ(α)) = ϕ(γ) = ϕ(α),663
as required. Now, why is g non-decreasing? I.e., why for all x, y ∈ ψ(Aω) we have x ≤ y =⇒664
g(x) ≤ g(y)? Indeed, g(x) = ϕ(γx), g(y) = ϕ(γy) for some γx ∈ ψ−1(x) and γy ∈ ψ−1(y).665
Now, since x ≤ y, we have x = ψ(γx) ≤ ψ(γy) = y. By taking the contraposition of (6) we666
get that g(x) = ϕ(γx) ≤ ϕ(γy) = g(y), as required.667
Finally, we show that any g : ψ(Aω) → R with ϕ = g ◦ψ must be continuous. For that we668
show that |g(x)−g(y)| ≤ |x−y| for all x, y ∈ ψ(Aω). Take any α, β ∈ Aω with x = ψ(α) and669
y = ψ(β). By prefix-monotonicity of ϕ we have that either ϕ(wα) ≥ ϕ(wβ) for all w ∈ A∗670
or ϕ(wα) ≤ ϕ(wβ) for all w ∈ A∗. Up to swapping x and y we may assume that the first671
option holds. Then672









≥ ϕ(α) − ϕ(β) ≥ 0.673
On the left here we have x− y, and on the right we have ϕ(α) −ϕ(β) = g ◦ψ(α) − g ◦ψ(β) =674
g(x) − g(y).675
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